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Showing the way out of the fly bottle:
searching for Wittgenstein in Norway
Jan Estep
Department of Art, University of Minnesota
Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein(1889–1951) famously wrote in his second book
titled Philosophical Investigations that one of his goals in
philosophy was ‘to shew the fly the way out of the
flybottle.’1 The comment is a direct attack on the
myopic ways philosophers can trap themselves in their
own gnarly problems. Wittgenstein hoped to remedy
the basic confusion at the heart of most philosophical
investigations, by clarifying the navigable landscape of
human knowledge, in other words, by showing what we
can and cannot do within philosophy.
Wittgenstein was primarily concerned with lan-
guage: the way it relates to the world and the ways
we use it to communicate with each other. Although
his thinking on the subject displays a radical change
between early and late in his career he always assumed
that language was central to human experience. With
its discursive and text-centric nature, philosophy in
particular depends on a person’s ability to express
meaningful statements, that is, to build convincing
arguments within clearly framed contexts. However,
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language can also be put to much more speculative ends. Philosophers ask all sorts of impos-
sible questions, things that cannot be answered definitively or with any kind of sense. There
is a strange oddness to most philosophers’ language use; driven by skepticism and the infa-
mous ‘Why?’, philosophers are reluctant to take things at face value, and tend to over-worry
the connection between words, intent, and meaning. Where in many situations the skewed
perspective unearths implicit contradictions and can help us get to the root of our disagree-
ments with one another, often it introduces more epistemological drama than is necessary or
even relevant. Wittgenstein believed that if we understood the nature of our confusion –
that it was the oddness of our methods rather than anything inherent in the things them-
selves that led to puzzlement – then many of our problems would go away.
For Wittgenstein metaphysics was the prime suspect, that branch of philosophy that
sought to articulate and discern the underlying principles of all being. Any attempt to stand
outside the whole, therefore outside language, is doomed to failure. Unfortunately, our lan-
guage allows us to conceive of such a transcendental stance. We can ask what is behind our
language to assure us of its reference. We can create circular arguments that appear logical
but nonetheless lead nowhere. And we can posit an objectivity to our situation that belies
the essential subjectivity of all knowing. Hence the fly trapped in a fly bottle of its own
making.
I remembered Wittgenstein’s plea about flies and fly bottles as I tromped along the banks
of Lake Eidsvatnet in Skjolden, Norway. I had come to Norway searching for the remains
of a small hut Wittgenstein built here and was deep in the thick brash edging the lake, try-
ing to follow a faint trail that supposedly led up to the site. As I neared the water, swarms
of black flies billowed up from the ground and engulfed me. Immediately Wittgenstein’s
words danced in my head and I knew I was on the right track. My motives for coming to
Norway were still unclear to me; I had a vague hope that I would somehow understand
Wittgenstein better, but I did not know what to expect or what I would find. I was looking
for signs and the flies provided that.
Wittgenstein first visited Skjolden on a short holiday in 1913. He traveled with a friend
from Cambridge, England, where he lectured in philosophy. Finding the small town to his
liking, he returned alone a few months later for an extended stay. It was at this point that
he decided to commission the hut. In stark contrast to the social circles of Cambridge and
Vienna he appreciated the simplicity and seriousness of the place. He interacted with a small
group of local residents and occasional colleagues, but overall he lived a relatively hermetic
existence in Norway. He valued the seclusion so he could attend to his work and his days
were spent writing and going for long walks. Wittgenstein lived here off and on for various
periods of time until 1950. While in Norway he wrote notes that formed the basis of his
most seminal books: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Notes on Logic, Philosophical Investigations,
Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, and Culture and Value.
Skjolden sits on the end of the Lustrafjord in the heart of the Sogn fjord district, roughly
250 km northeast of Bergen. It is surrounded on all sides by mountains that rise quickly up
from the water. The hut site is perched on a high narrow ledge, overlooking Lake Eidsvatnet,
which runs into the fjord. There is no detailed map of the hut’s location and it is no longer
visible from the lake or the main road. Only a rudimentary sketch exists, drawn by
Wittgenstein in 1936 for G.E. Moore, a fellow philosopher who was visiting from England.
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The sketch pictures the town, the
lake, and the major features of the
surrounding topography (moun-
tains, rivers, fjord). It provides a
general orientation to Wittgenstein’s
hut, but the level of abstraction
means that reaching the hut still
requires basic route-finding skills.
When I realized the paucity of
Wittgenstein’s drawing – the fact
that it can only get you in the
general area – it both did and did
not make sense to me. Here was
a man so meticulous in his ana-
lytical pursuits, yet his directions
to the hut were sketchy and
vague. But here also was a man
who trusted our ordinary abilities
to communicate, to speak within
the same language games as he
called them, so obviously he felt
the map was good enough to
accomplish its goal. The fact that
there was more to the picture
than pictured or more precisely
more to the world than repre-
sented by his map or his words
fits perfectly with Wittgenstein’s
love-hate relationship with refer-
ence. Nevertheless, while on site
I decided a more definitive doc-
ument was needed, something that
could help others find Wittgenstein
with more confidence.
Despite the lack of explicit
directions, there is an informal
trail that leads to the site, forged
by others who have come look-
ing for the building. The signed
trailhead lies just to the left of
Vassbakken Kro Camping, a typ-
ical Norwegian campground out-
side of town. The trail initially
follows a dirt road, lined to the
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right with brilliant red-twigged
dogwood and to the left with a
grassy plot of open land. It con-
tinues over a stream feeding Lake
Eidsvatnet to a ‘Y’ at the bottom
of the mountains. Going up at
this point takes you to Mount
Hjerseggi, but the way to the hut
follows left. Hugging the moun-
tainside then veering slightly
away, the trail moves through a
series of muddy fields that take
you closer and closer to the lake.
Before reaching the water the
trail peters out into a sinewy tan-
gle of criss-crossing tractor paths. Farmers still use this front land for planting. In fact, the
day I arrived, a farmer had just applied a fresh layer of cow manure. I had to struggle through
the muck to reach the edge of the woods, where the trail picks up again, though much fainter
and narrower.
Two hand-made wood placards mark the entry point into the woods, one stating
‘Wittgenstein,’ the other stating ‘W.’ The trail passes between these two signs and then leads just
to the left of a dilapidated wood shed. Once you enter the woods the trail is tagged with large
red W and TW letters. They are spray painted onto rocks, trees, and other immovable objects
along the way. In Norway, trails that are officially maintained by the Norwegian Mountain Touring
Association (DNT) are marked with bright red Ts. On an ad hoc basis someone has borrowed
this familiar marking system and marked the Wittgenstein trail in a similar manner.
After the freeform tracking through the mud and manure the signs are reassuring. A per-
son can’t really get lost here: the lake and the mountains keep you oriented. But uncharacter-
istically for a nature hike I welcomed the evidence that others had been here before me. It
suggested a community of Wittgenstein devotees, each of us on our own but heading in a
similar direction. As the trail picks its way through the woods, it bounds the lake and finally
heads up into the mountainside. A series of short, steep switchbacks later and the final turn
abruptly ends at the site of the hut. Wittgenstein used to row across the lake and dock just
below, avoiding the walk through the muddy fields. Or when the lake was frozen, he would
walk across it instead. However, he climbed the same switchbacks that any visitor must take
to reach his home.
I was of two minds when I got to the top of the trail. The site itself is nothing special.
There are no markings or commemorative plaques. The wood structure is gone, leaving only
the stone foundation and a root cellar, which the natural environment is gradually overtaking.
Even the scenery is generically nice, not spectacular. If I didn’t know who Wittgenstein was,
the place would not stand out, just another abandoned relic left to fade away in the pretty
Norwegian countryside. But given my knowledge of Wittgenstein, it had all the charge of any
pilgrimage site. A unique individual had sought solace here, and I was now in close proxim-
ity to where the crux of his thinking occurred. Yet it was an intangible bit of myth and 
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history that convinced me of the significance of this place, not anything I could see for myself
on site.
This dual response, by which events experienced in body simultaneously took on addi-
tional interpretive meaning, occurred throughout the search for the hut. It happened when I
moved gingerly through the mud and cow manure: how appropriate that one should have to
wade through shit prior to reaching any higher state of philosophical understanding. It hap-
pened when I first spotted the crude signposts along the trail: chagrined at the overly obvi-
ous signage but welcoming the friendly gesture. And it happened during the onslaught of
flies by the water. Part of me relished the attack: The perfect storm of insects was the world
showing me viscerally what Wittgenstein meant. The flies were being released from their bot-
tles en masse, flooding the air with a great energy that could now be put to better use. But
alongside this interpretation I was frantic that I might inhale the swarm and choke or suffo-
cate. They buzzed my face and torso like an apocalyptic cloud. I might respect the irony of
awakening the flies from their slumber in Wittgensteinian terms, but in body they were sud-
den, thick, and distressing.
Even the mix of joy and disappointment at trail’s end resonated on multiple levels. The
anticlimactic feeling – the recognition that there is no there, there after all – worked with
Wittgenstein’s notion of a failed metaphysics. Philosophy simply couldn’t deliver on that
promise. Nonetheless, although an epiphany was not to be had so easily, the hiking was good.
This double consciousness made my search for Wittgenstein’s hut much more complex
than a simple walk in the woods. Phenomena were always experienced on two levels: that of
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an embodied subject making its way through an empirical world of over-
whelming sensations (confrontation with the physical landscape) and that
of an analytical subject narrating the meaning of events in extra-sensor-
ial ways (confrontation with Wittgenstein’s texts). I don’t mean to imply
that one of these responses is more authentic or purer than the other:
I believe the sense data are every bit as mediated and processed as the
extra-sensory data. Nor was metaphor ever strong enough to subsume
what was happening to me physically. They both remained tense and
active, and greatly enhanced my experience of this place.
What does a rich life of the mind look like? Can it be found in the
wilds of Norway or located on a map? Wittgenstein’s choice to live such
a Spartan existence shows that it is not external trappings that enable
intense thinking and creativity. Rather it is a cultivated ability to make the
world to be more than it appears. To Wittgenstein’s credit, this is as much
the real benefit of philosophy – or the language deployed therein – as it
is its primary flaw.
Acknowledgement
Map drawings and photographs courtesy Jan Estep, 2007.
Biographical note
Jan Estep is an artist, writer, and trained philosopher. Her art writing has appeared in Frieze, Modern
Painters, Bomb, Afterall, and New art examiner. Her artist books Ad Infinitum and Desert Maps, and Hot Air
Sincerely are available at Printed Matter, Inc., along with a fully illustrated, folded sheet map titled Searching
for Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lake Eidsvatnet, Skjolden, Sogn, Norway. For more information visit
www.janestep.com. She can be contacted at: Department of Art, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis,
MN 55455, USA; email: jestep@umn.edu
Note
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (3rd Edition), trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York,
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1953/1968), Proposition #309, p. 103.
